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are susceptible to free-riding between sel￿sh generations. Only in an
ongoing relationship is there a possibility to overcome free-riding be-
haviours. This paper investigates the pattern of tax payments that
are likely to ￿nance both implementation and maintenance of a public
project in an ongoing economy with overlapping generations of two-
period lived agents. The study identi￿es conditions under which coop-
eration among generations can be achieved as a steady state subgame
perfect equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
￿And there is no future
In England￿ s dreaming
No future, no future,
No future for you
No future, no future,
No future for me￿(The Sex Pistols)
This somewhat provocative song was released in 1977 by the famous Eng-
lish punk rock band to coincide with the Queen￿ s Silver Jubilee. At the time,
it was regarded by the old generation as a threat uttered by the young gener-
ation to the British society. Paradoxically enough, the threat of ￿no future￿
can be regarded as an e⁄ective mechanism of providing the old generation
with correct incentives to behave cooperatively. Part of the motivation for
this article is to develop this argument more formally.
The bulk of the analysis concerns the pattern of tax payments used to ￿-
3nance public projects that bene￿t two overlapping generations. Every young
generation must live willy-nilly with public projects that have been under-
taken by the previous old generation. Such projects have several prominent
features. First, the contribution made by the old to the project will not be
reversed since there is no tomorrow for this generation. When initiating the
project, the old generation incurs costs that are sunk once they are borne
and hence create a commitment value. This commitment value is all the
higher as the public project is more speci￿c to the generation that initiates
it. Second, the young generation is excluded from the genesis of the public
project but not from its external e⁄ects on welfare, whether they be bene￿-
cial or detrimental. Furthermore, contrary to the old, the young have future
prospects and so future bene￿ts are more important to them than they are
to the old.
Obvious examples are given by all the public buildings and equipment
inherited from the previous generation, such as hospitals, libraries, highway-
road networks, military sites and weapon stocks accumulated for national
defense. The commitment value of public constructions will be high to the
extent that they have no value on a second-hand market1 and cannot be
1For weapon stocks, however, this may not be the case.
4allocated to another use than that for which they have been designed. Sim-
ilarly, some of the public policies implemented by one generation may have
high commitment values and lasting e⁄ects on the next generation. Such
is the case for nuclear programs or wars involving costs that can hardly be
recouped. Sunk costs also characterize human investments such as educa-
tion: every child is stuck with her mother tongue and the level of education
provided by his parents. On one hand, children bene￿t from sharing the
same language as their parents and going to the college chosen by their par-
ents. On the other hand, children may be cornered by some slangy language
daily used in family, too speci￿c features of the old￿ s culture or too narrow
investments made by their parents for education.
Public projects of common concern for two overlapping generations are
susceptible to free-riding problems between generations which are exacer-
bated by the absence of tomorrow. One problem deals with the young￿ s
temptation to shirk ￿nancing the maintenance cost of the public project
once sunk contributions have been made by the old. This temptation may
be hard to resist when the young know the old to place a higher value on the
public project. Another problem will arise from the old￿ s incentive to shirk
paying for the implementation cost of the public project. This incentive may
5be strong either because the old value the public project less than the young,
or because the old anticipate the free-riding of the young and are unwilling
to ￿nance alone the public project. This paper addresses such free-riding
problems and shows how to mitigate them in an ongoing economy.
For this, we investigate whether overlapping generations are likely to co-
operate in implementing public projects and ￿nance both implementation
and maintenance. The problem of cooperation among generations is formal-
ized in a dynamic game with in￿nite horizon and overlapping generations
of two-period-lived agents motivated by narrow self-interest. Every period
both generations choose how much to spend on a public project ￿nanced with
taxes. The decisions about tax payments are sequential, with the old moving
￿rst and the young moving second. This captures a situation in which the
old￿ s contributions to the public project are sunk at the time they are made.
Assuming complete and perfect information, the analysis seeks steady state
subgame perfect equilibria of the game.
The short-term version of the model is closely related to Varian￿ s (1994)
sequential contributions game. It obtains a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium in which maintenance of the public project fails to be ￿nanced. With
no future prospects, if the young know that the old￿ s valuation of the public
6project is signi￿cantly higher, they will free-ride and let the old pay for the
whole cost. Conversely, the old may shirk ￿nancing implementation even
if they value the public project more than the young. Knowing that they
will live shorter, the old have stronger incentives than the young to squander
money for private consumption and free-ride on the young to implement the
public project.
Under in￿nite horizon, the use of a trigger strategy is shown to sustain
cooperative behaviours between the two overlapping generations and achieve
both implementation and maintenance of the public project. The intuition
behind the result is outlined as follows. As every young generation can
observe how many resources the old generation has devoted to the public
project, the young are in position to mete out a reward or a punishment to
the old. The reward is the higher amount of public good and services provided
by maintenance of the public project and the punishment is the reversion to
the worst sustainable outcome, i. e., the equilibrium with no future prospects.
Moreover, by rewarding the old, the young reward themselves as future old.
This self-policing mechanism proves to be su¢ ciently powerful to achieve
cooperation among generations and overcome the temptation to free-ride
of the two overlapping generations. As long as tax payments are kept up
7to the cooperative level, the economy presumes that generations abide by
implicit cooperation and the reward ensues: there is both implementation
and maintenance of the public project. If this reward is large enough, then
cooperation among generations will persist in equilibrium.
The present result that overlapping generations of ￿nitely-lived agents
succeed in cooperating when they engage in an ongoing relationship departs
from the usual Folk Theorems which have been previously established in the
economics literature. For example, Kandori (1992) presents a Folk Theorem
for in￿nitely repeated games played by overlapping generations of ￿nitely-
lived agents. However, this author assumes the agents to choose their actions
simultaneously. Wen (2002) formalizes a Folk Theorem for a class of repeated
games in which agents do not move simultaneously in every subgame. While
this Folk Theorem explains cooperation in organizations run by the same
set of in￿nitely-lived agents, it does not provide direct insight into ongo-
ing relationships between ￿nitely-lived agents. Technically, our framework
combines the sequential structure of Varian (1984) for the stage game of
tax payments, and the in￿nitely lived overlapping generations structure of
Samuelson (1958) for the ongoing economy. A standard result is that cooper-
ation fails to be sustained in an ongoing organization with only two members
8moving simultaneously (see Cremer (1986)). By contrast, we derive condi-
tions under which cooperation among the two overlapping generations can
be achieved as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the ongoing game. Sequen-
tiality of moves between generations is crucial for this result. Knowing that
their tax payment is observable, the old anticipate that their decision will be
responded optimally before they retire, which would not be the case if the
moves were simultaneous. Due to sequentiality, the prospect of bene￿ting
from a public project of higher size or quality becomes relevant from the
old￿ s point of view: the latter have now an incentive to cooperate since they
can be rewarded for their cooperation. Furthermore, the possibility that in-
tergenerational relationship will go on is likely to make the young feel some
altruistic concern for the old, even though the young are sel￿sh. Indeed, the
next young generation is expected by the current young generation to abide
by the reward given to the old generation. And so it goes, the forthcoming
young will be rewarded in turn by their descendants for their cooperative tax
payment. Thus, the future is more valued, the higher the reward that can
be expected by the young from contributing the cooperative amount to the
public project.
The ability to cooperate in the provision of a public good has been previ-
9ously discussed, but not, for the most part, in overlapping generation models.
Mac Millan (1979) analyzes how trigger strategies can support a cooperative
equilibrium by providing ￿rms with the correct incentives for supplying pub-
lic intermediate goods. Pecorino (1999) investigates the free-rider problem
within a generation in a dynamic setting and shows that cooperation can
be achieved even in large economies. Admati and Perry (1991) depart from
the traditional formulation that deals with the scale of provision of the pub-
lic good and address a problem where a public project is either provided or
not. They develop a model in which agents alternate in making contributions
to the public project until the project is completed. They show that only
low-cost projects are completed and many socially e¢ cient projects are not
completed. Unlike Admati and Perry (1991), the focus here is on the scale of
the public good that is provided and the agents do not alternate in making
sequential contributions.
Overlapping generations models have been widely used to address the
free-rider problem central to many studies concerning the exhaustible re-
sources or the environmental protection. Considering environmental quality
as a particular instance of public good, a number of articles highlight the di¢ -
culty to internalize polluting externalities between generations (see Howarth
10and Norgaard (1992), John et al. (1995) or Rangel (2003)). The present
work can be linked to this literature in the case of an environmental friendly
public project, for instance a ￿ ow of pollution abatement goods and services,
which would signi￿cantly reduce the environmental damages borne by old
and young people currently alive. This paper provides the insight that there
may be incentives for two overlapping generations to cooperate in paying en-
vironmental maintenance and improvement taxes, even when generations are
sel￿sh. This statement di⁄ers from that in Rangel (2003) in the sense that
there is no need here to force a link between social security and investment in
an environmental public good to foster cooperation among generations. The
main reason is that, in the model developed here, contributions to a public
project are assumed to bene￿t the generations that make them.
Section 2 presents the short-term version of the game and the equilib-
rium outcomes with no future prospects. Section 3 investigates the ongoing
economy with two overlapping generations and identi￿es a class of subgame
perfect equilibria. Section 4 concludes.
112 The equilibrium with no future prospects
This section investigates the design of an optimal public project that bene￿ts
two overlapping generations in the short term. For this, we consider a game
G with the same sequential structure as that in Varian (1994). The game
G will be the one-period stage game of the dynamic game introduced in the
next section.
The economy is consisting of two overlapping sel￿sh generations. The
￿rst generation to move, i = 1, is called ￿old￿ , and the second one, i = 2,
is called ￿young￿ . The old decide to pay a tax t1 used to ￿nance the imple-
mentation of the public project. The young observe t1, hence the size and
existence of the public project, and decide in turn how many resources to
devote to the public project. This contribution will ￿nance either mainte-
nance or implementation of the public project depending on whether the old
have already ￿nanced implementation or not. The young choose to pay a
tax t2 for their expenditures on the public project. When determining how
much they spend on the implementation of the public project, the old act as
a Stackelberg leader anticipating the likely responses of the young, that is,
how much they will spend on the maintenance of the public project. Once
the public project has been constructed, the young cannot be excluded from
12the bene￿ts that are generated. Sequentiality captures the idea that the old￿ s
choices are somewhat irreversible.
Each generation divides its wealth wi between private consumption of a
good, xi ￿ 0, and tax payment ti ￿ 0 in return for the public project of
size g which is a direct conveyer of utility to both generations. Let p denote
the price of the private consumption good. The public project is produced
under constant return to scales and its level is determined by g = ct1 + mt2
where c;m > 0. Parameters c and m are e¢ ciency characteristics of the old
and the young respectively (c stands for construction/implementation which
is expected to be the old￿ s task and m for maintenance which should be
assigned to the young). Following Barro (1991), the assumption of constant
returns suggests a broad view of public project that encompasses human
investments such as education and nonhuman investments in buildings and
equipment.
Generation i faces the budget constraint wi = pxi+ti and has quasi-linear
preferences described by xi + aiu(g), hence:
xi + aiu(g) = (wi ￿ ti)=p + aiu(ct1 + mt2): (1)
Parameter ai represents the concern of generation i for the public project
13and the sign of ai indicates whether the project has bene￿cial or detrimental
e⁄ects on generation i￿ s well-being. For instance, parameter values of a2 < 0
allow for the possibility that the young expect the public project to exert
negative externalities on their well-being, such as a war or a nuclear project.
Let us introduce two useful de￿nitions. Generation i￿ s tax payment ti
at generational autarky is de￿ned as the tax paid by generation i when the
other generation spends none on the public project. Thus, using budget
constraints and assuming interior solutions, t1 solves equation
ca1u
0(ct1) = 1=p; (2)
and t2 solves equation
ma2u
0(mt2) = 1=p: (3)
When parameter values are such that mt2 < ct1, the old care more about
the public project than the young since the former would contribute more
if they were the only contributor. Moreover, the inequality is equivalent to
u0(ct1) < u0(mt2) since u(:) is concave. Hence, from (2) and (3), mt2 7 ct1 ,
a2 7 a1. Assume that wi > ti so that consumption of the private good is
always strictly positive.
14Game G unfolds as follows. The old choose to pay a tax t1 for the im-
plementation of a public project. The young observe t1 and then decide to
￿nance further the public project by paying a tax t2. Hence, the young￿ s
choice of tax payment t2 if it is positive must satisfy
ma2u
0(ct1 + mt2) = 1=p: (4)





on the public project. Let T2 (t1) denote the young￿ s





t2 ￿ ct1=m if t1 ￿ mt2=c;
0 otherwise.
(5)
The following proposition characterizes the Stackelberg equilibrium pair
of tax payments (t￿
1;X2(t￿
1)) which is associated with the backward-induction
outcome of the game G. It turns out that maintenance of the public project
cannot be achieved with no future prospects.
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Assuming that the old move ￿rst, their utility as a function of their tax





(w1 ￿ t1)=p + a1u(mt2) if t1 ￿ mt2=c,
(w1 ￿ t1)=p + a1u(ct1) otherwise.
This function is quasi-concave and strictly decreasing in t1 provided that
ct1 < mt2 (or, equivalently a1 < a2). Otherwise, the function is not quasi-
concave and has two local optima, namely 0 and t1. If mt2 < ct1 and
a1u(ct1) ￿ t1=p <a1u(mt2), then 0 is a global optimum, i. e., the old free-
ride on the young and achieve utility w1=p + a1u(mt2). If mt2 < ct1 and
a1u(ct1)￿t1=p >a1u(mt2), then t1 is a global optimum, hence the old ￿nance
alone the public project and achieve utility (w1 ￿ t1)=p + a1u(ct1):
End of proof.
16When a1 < a2, the young value more the public project than the old and,
not surprisingly, the latter set t￿
1 at zero. That is, they spend none on the
public project and free-ride on the young to ￿nance its implementation. As a
result, the young choose the tax payment that would prevail at generational
autarky to ￿nance the public project.
When a2 < a1, the old are more concerned about the public project than
the young and two contrasting results can emerge depending on whether the
old are scarcely more concerned or far more concerned than the young about
the public project.
Firstly, if a1u(ct1)￿t1=p <a1u(mt2), the old are scarcely more concerned
than the young about the public project in the sense that the old would prefer
the young to ￿nance alone the public project than ￿nance it themselves.
Thus, in equilibrium the old let the young undertake the public project and
pay themselves for its costs. This seems somewhat paradoxical since the
young contribute everything while they care less about the public project.
Such a result would not arise if both generations were making simultaneous
decisions: the threat to free-ride by the old who are known to value more the
public project would not be credible. By contrast, in the sequential game,
the young may observe the ￿fait accompli￿that the old have spent none on
17implementation of the public project.
Secondly, consider the case where the old are far more concerned than the







a1. Then, the old ￿nd the public project more valuable if they ￿nance its im-
plementation themselves than if this expenditure were left to the young alone.
In equilibrium, the old set t￿
1 at t1, that is, the old choose the tax payment
at generational autarky and the young fail to ￿nance further maintenance of
the public project.
3 The ongoing economy
To model long-term relationships between the old and the young generations,
we consider now the ongoing economy with an overlapping generations struc-
ture that is described by the following game G(1): in each of in￿nitely many
periods t = 1;2:::, a young generation enters the economy and replaces the
old generation that has left at the end of the previous period; consumers￿life
is assumed to last two periods, hence, at each date, the economy matches
an old generation staying here for one period and a young generation stay-
ing here for two periods; every period, generation i is endowed with wealth
18wi, consumes a private good and decides how much to spend on the public
project. Let tik denote the tax paid by generation i in period k and hk the
entire history through period k:
hk = ((t11;t21);:::;(t1k￿1;t2k￿1)):
In each period, the old decide on their own contribution to the public
project by choosing their tax payment without knowing the young￿ s contri-
bution. By contrast, the young decide on their tax payment after observing
the old￿ s contribution. As we shall see, the young￿ s knowledge of the old￿ s
choice of tax is crucial to induce cooperative behaviours between genera-
tions. Knowing that their behaviour is observable, the old have an incentive
to cooperate since they can be rewarded for this cooperation. Moreover, by
rewarding the old, the young reward themselves as future old.
In period k, the old￿ s utility reduces to v1(t1k;t2k) ￿ (w1 ￿ t1k)=p +
a1u(ct1k + mt2k) since they disappear at the end of the period. De￿ning
v2(t1k;t2k) ￿ (w2￿t2k)=p+a2u(ct1k+mt2k), the present value of the lifetime
utility for consumers born at the beginning of period k is given by
v2(t1k;t2k) + ￿v1(t1k+1;t2k+1); (6)
19where ￿ represents the discount factor.
A strategy for generation i = 1 which takes a decision in period k is a
function ’1k(hk) = t1k that speci￿es the tax payment at any possible history.
Moreover, as the young move second, their strategy in period k is a function
’2k(hk;t1k) = t2k. Consequently, the subgames of G(1) can be grouped into
two classes: those beginning after hk and those beginning after (hk;t1k).
We use the steady state subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) as the solu-
tion concept. Hence, the generation￿ s strategies must satisfy the two following
conditions:
1. Along the equilibrium path, the tax paid by any generation i in period
k is the same as that paid by generation i in period k + 1,
2. The generation￿ s strategies must constitute a Nash equilibrium on every
subgame of G(1).
To model the possibility of cooperation among generations in G(1) and
tackle at the same time the problem of the in￿nite variety of SPE, we shall
restrict attention to a simple variant of trigger strategies. Formally, let (t1;t2)
be an agreed-upon pro￿le of tax payments and de￿ne strategies ’ik (t1;t2) =
20(’1k(hk);’2k(hk;t1k)) for generations by:





















Note that the strategies ’ik (t1;t2) closely follow the logic of subgame
perfection by requiring, ￿rst, that the old respond optimally to any deviation
that is detected at the end of some previous period, and second, that the
young respond optimally to a deviation by the old during a period. Hence,
the old pay the agreed-upon tax t1 as long as in every past period both the
old and the young have paid their agreed-upon tax; if any generation has
failed to pay the agreed-upon tax in the previous period, then the old revert
to the equilibrium tax payment t￿
1 with no future prospects. Furthermore,
the young match the old￿ s decision to pay the agreed-upon tax as long as no
21generation has reneged the agreed-upon tax payment in both the past and
the present period; otherwise, given an observed t1k, the young choose the
no-future equilibrium strategy T2(t1k).
As choices of tax payments are sequential, the young can provide the old
with an incentive to cooperate by responding optimally to their defection.
If instead the moves in the stage game were simultaneous, the old couldn￿ t
be given any incentive to pay an agreed-upon tax since they are in their last
period of life. Knowing that their behaviour cannot be observable, they would
be better o⁄ shirking, and so they would choose the same tax payment as
that emerging in the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move stage game.
This argument directly follows from the result in Cremer (1986) that the
threat to withhold cooperation cannot work when the ongoing organization
has only two members.
Let us now determine the conditions under which the trigger strategies
’ik (t1;t2) are subgame perfect.
Lemma 1: Suppose that both generations follow the trigger strategies
’ik (t1;t2). Then, whatever the previous history, the best possible deviation










a1u(mt2) if a1 < a2 or
￿
a2 < a1 and a1u(ct1) ￿ t1=p < a1u(mt2)
￿
;
a1u(ct1) ￿ t1=p if a2 < a1 and a1u(ct1) ￿ t1=p > a1u(mt2).
Proof :
Let td
1 6= t1 denote the best possible tax payment for the old when both
generations play the trigger strategies ’ik (t1;t2). If the old shirk paying the
agreed-upon tax t1, then a subgame of G(1) begins, in which the young
decide on their tax payment after observing the old￿ s decision. By requiring
that the young respond optimally to the old, the trigger strategies ’ik (t1;t2)
satisfy subgame perfection. Hence, the old anticipate the young￿ s best re-
sponse to their choice td

















Thus, the optimal solution for the deviating old is given by the equilibrium
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The following lemma gives, at the same time, the best possible deviation
from the agreed-upon tax payment t2 and the worst SPE outcome for the
young in G(1):
Lemma 2: Suppose that both generations follow the trigger strategies
’ik (t1;t2). Given hk = ((t11;t21);:::;(t1k￿1;t2k￿1)) and t1k = t1, the best








24Suppose that the young shirk after observing the old￿ s agreed-upon tax
payment t1 and spend t0
2 on the public project. Then, they trigger a punish-







1)) when old. From Lemma 1, this is a SPE outcome. Follow-
ing the trigger strategies ’ik (t1;t2), any deviation that is detected at the
end of a period k must be responded optimally by both the old and the




1)) which depends on their deviation t0
2: Thus,
the best possible deviation for the young is to pay a tax T2(t1) which yields
v2(t1;T2(t1)) + ￿v1(t￿
1;T2(t￿
1)). This measures the greatest lifetime utility in
the absence of cooperation among generations.
End of proof.
Given that the old pay the agreed-upon tax t1 to ￿nance the public
project, the greatest lifetime utility for the young reneging cooperation is
given by v2(t1;T2(t1)) + ￿v1(t￿
1;T2(t￿
1)). Furthermore, this is the worst SPE
outcome for the young in G(1) since, from Lemma 1, v1(t￿
1;T2(t￿
1)) is a SPE
outcome for the old in G(1):
Suppose the young observe a tax payment set by the old at the agreed-
upon level t1. Then, by paying the agreed-upon tax t2, the young can earn
25v2(t1;t2)+￿v1(t1;t2), which represents their lifetime utility of spending t2 on
the public project while young and t1 while old, and so bene￿ting in exchange
from an even provision of public good during lifetime. Denote V (t1;t2) as
the function measuring the net value of cooperation among generations from
the pro￿le (t1;t2), that is,







1)) measures the greatest lifetime utility
for the young in absence of cooperation among generations.
Proposition 2 below characterizes the agreed-upon pro￿les of tax pay-
ments (t1;t2) that can be achieved as a SPE using strategies ’ik (t1;t2).
Proposition 2: A pro￿le of tax payments (t1;t2) can be achieved as a
SPE using strategies ’ik (t1;t2) if and only if
V (t1;t2) ￿ 0:
Proof :
We argue that the pro￿le (t1;t2) can be achieved as a SPE of G(1)
26following strategies ’ik (t1;t2) if and only if, for any k,












for all t1k 2 [0;w1] and t2k 2 [0;w2]:
Using (9), the right-hand side of (12) can be rewritten v1(t1k;T2(t1k)) for
any t1k 6= t1. From Lemma 1, v1(t￿
1;T2(t￿
1)) = maxt1k6=t1 v1(t1k;T2(t1k)) is
what the old obtain at most when they deviate and anticipate the young to






which requires that, in period k, the old￿ s utility from abiding by the agreed-
upon tax payment t1 is higher than their utility from being at the no-future
equilibrium.
Similarly, from (13), it should be worth the young￿ s while to contribute
27t2 in period k, thereby inducing both the old and the young generations
to pay the agreed-upon taxes for the public project in period k + 1. The
left-hand side of inequality (13) measures the lifetime utility for any gen-
eration of following the trigger strategies ’ik (t1;t2) along the equilibrium





= v1(t1;t2) when old. The right-hand side of
inequality (13) measures what can be obtained during lifetime in the absence
of cooperation among generations. If the young deviate to t2k in period k,







1)) when old: the deviation is responded optimally by both of the
generations in period k+1. From Lemma 2, v2(t1;T2(t1)) = maxt2k v2 (t1;t2k)
measures what the young receive at most by responding optimally to the old￿ s
agreed-upon tax payment t1.
Finally, inequality (13) is equivalent to V (t1;t2) ￿ 0, which can be rewrit-
ten




1))] ￿ v2(t1;T2(t1)) ￿ v2(t1;t2): (15)
By de￿nition of T2(t1), v2(t1;T2(t1))￿v2(t1;t2) ￿ 0 for all t1 and t2 , and
so, inequality (15) implies (14).
We have so far shown that if condition V (t1;t2) ￿ 0 holds then strategies
28’ik (t1;t2) are a Nash equilibrium of G(1).
To show that strategies ’ik (t1;t2) are subgame-perfect, we must prove
that they constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of G(1).
Firstly, consider the subgames beginning after an agreed-upon history, i.
e., those beginning after hk = ((t1;t2);:::;(t1;t2)) and those beginning after
(hk;t1). Then, strategies ’ik (t1;t2) have previously been shown to be a Nash
equilibrium provided that condition V (t1;t2) ￿ 0 is satis￿ed.
Secondly, consider the subgames beginning after any history in which the
outcome of at least one earlier stage di⁄ers from the agreed-upon one. Then,
either a deviation has been detected at the end of a period, or a deviation
by the old is detected during a period. In both cases, strategies ’ik (t1;t2)
involve that the deviation is responded optimally. Indeed:
1. If a deviation has been detected at the end of a period, say k ￿1, then
a punishment phase begins in the next period k. Following (8) and (9),
the old choose their no-future equilibrium tax payment ’1k(hk) = t￿
1,
anticipating that the young will choose to pay the tax ’2k(hk;t￿
1) =
T2(t￿
1) in the same period. Moreover, the young anticipate that they
will face, next period, the same problem as the old in the present pe-
riod. Hence, the young in period k anticipate that they will choose
29’1k+1(hk+1) = t￿
1 next period, which will be responded optimally by
the young in the same period, i. e., ’2k+1(hk+1;t￿
1) = T2(t￿
1). Thus,
starting from any point in the considered subgame, the trigger strate-
gies ’ik (t1;t2) constitute a Nash equilibrium since the generation to
move chooses to pay its no-future equilibrium tax which maximizes
its intertemporal utility given the subsequent strategies of the other
generation and itself.
2. If a deviation has been detected within a period, after observing the
old￿ s tax choice, then the young begin a punishment phase during the
same period and the same reasoning as above applies.
End of proof.
After observing the old￿ s contribution to the public project, every young
generation needs to decide how much to pay for this project, and in exchange
the young bene￿t from a public project of same scale when old, to the extent
that the next young generation will choose the same level of tax payment as
that chosen by the young in the previous period. The sequentiality of the
overlapping generations moves is the key to the di⁄erence between the present
model and that in Cremer (1986). As the old￿ s behaviour is observable,
30the young can mete out rewards or punishments depending on what they
have learnt. Even though they are about to leave, the old can be given
positive incentives to spend more on the public project than t￿
1, that is,
what they would spend if there were no future prospects. If the old￿ s tax
payment is seen to reach the agreed-upon level t1, the young reward them
by paying, in turn, the agreed-upon tax t2. It follows that the public project
bene￿ting both generations is improved in the sense that it will be maintained
by the young once constructed by the old. Moreover, by rewarding the old,
the young reward themselves as future old. They anticipate that, when
old, they will earn the same reward discounted at the present date, namely
￿ [v1(t1;t2) ￿ v1(t￿
1;T2(t￿
1))], provided that they choose the agreed-upon tax
payment t2. However, the young incur a loss v2(t1;T2(t1)) ￿ v2(t1;t2) from
rewarding the old, hence rewarding themselves as future old. To achieve
cooperation, the young￿ s prospect of reward must outweigh the opportunity
cost of rewarding the old. This is the meaning of inequality V (t1;t2) ￿ 0 :
the reward for abiding by the agreed-upon level in both periods of life must
outweigh the temptation to shirk and revert to the equilibrium behaviours in
generational autarky, which would prevail with no future prospects. When
this inequality holds for positive tax payments, an implicit contract can be
31conceived in which the young reward the old by ￿nancing maintenance of the
public project in exchange for the old ￿nancing implementation.
Obviously, for such cooperative behaviours to emerge in equilibrium,
agents need to be patient. Indeed, the future is more valued, the higher
the reward that can be expected from contributing the cooperative amount
to the public project. More precisely, consider a pair of tax payments (t1;t2)
such that inequality (14) is strictly met and denote by ￿
￿ the critical value








For all pairs of tax payments (t1;t2) satisfying (14) as a strict inequal-
ity, the index ￿
￿ measures the di¢ culty of maintaining cooperation among
generations: the lower is ￿
￿, the more likely it is that both generations will
select the agreed-upon tax payments (t1;t2). If ￿
￿ = 1, then cooperation fails
whatever ￿ and we are back in the situation with no future prospects: one
generation free-rides on the contribution of the other and no one pays for
maintenance of the public project. By contrast, if ￿
￿ = 0, then inequality
(15) is always satis￿ed provided that v1(t1;t2) > v1(t￿
1;T2(t￿
1)). Whatever
32￿, it will be in both generations￿interests to choose the agreed-upon taxes
(t1;t2) rather than the equilibrium taxes that would prevail with no future
prospects.
Moreover, it can be seen from (16) that limt2!T2(t1) ￿
￿ = 0. That is, among
all pairs of tax payments (t1;t2) satisfying condition (14), cooperation will be
easier to achieve as t2 approaches T2(t1) . The idea of cooperation here is to
provide the generation that is more willing to free-ride with an incentive to
make a positive contribution to the public project. The commitment value of
the old￿ s choice of tax together with the fact that the old don￿ t have so long
to live impose a strong constraint: the old must be rewarded for cooperation
regardless of whether they are more inclined to free-ride or not, otherwise
they will behave as if there were no future prospects. The old￿ s reward for
cooperation is given by v1(t1;t2) ￿ v1(t￿
1;T2(t￿
1)). The choice of the old￿ s tax
t1 must guarantee that this reward is positive, hence the old will enjoy the
public project more than that undertaken with no future prospects. The
numerator in (16) can be interpreted as the cost of cooperation borne by the
young, which is null at t2 = T2(t1). Finally, selecting tax payments t2 close
to T2(t1) facilitates cooperation by reducing the cost of rewarding the old. In
other words, cooperation among generations is all the more successful as the
33young adopt a behaviour closer to that prevailing with no future prospects.
To provide more insight on how tax payments should be designed to
ensure the existence of cooperative SPE involving both implementation and
maintenance of the public project, let us now distinguish between the two
cases that yield the opposite results in Proposition 1:
1. Case 1: either a1 < a2 or
￿
a2 < a1 and a1u(ct1) ￿ t1=p < a1u(mt2)
￿
meaning that the old are less concerned or scarcely more concerned
about the public project than the young. With no future prospects,
the old are better o⁄ free-riding on the young￿ s contribution.






< a1, that is, the old are
far more concerned than the young about the public project. With
no future prospects, the young are better o⁄ free-riding on the old￿ s
contribution.
Proposition 3: Cooperation cannot be achieved as a SPE with a pro￿le






Suppose that the old￿ s agreed-upon tax payment for implementation is




. Then T2(t1) = t2 ￿ ct1=m > 0. Replacing t2 by
this expression in the quasi-linear form of

















In case 1, the no-future equilibrium involves t￿
1 = 0 and T2(t￿
1) = t2 and





1)) = ￿t1=p: (18)
Thus, condition (14) is not met with t1 > 0.
In case 2, the equilibrium tax payments with no future prospects are
t￿
1 = t1 and T2(t￿















0. Again, condition (14) is not met with t1 > 0.
End of proof.
35Proposition 3 states that there is no cooperative equilibrium in which
both implementation and maintenance of the public project are ￿nanced by
positive taxes of t1 and T2(t1) paid by the old and the young respectively.
Consequently, observing in the ongoing economy that the old pay a positive
tax t1 to ￿nance implementation of the public project, the young should not
react by spending on maintenance the same amount of resources as that they
would spend with no future prospects, i. e., T2(t1). This level of expenditures
would fail to provide the old with more utility than what they would get
in equilibrium at generational autarky with no future prospects, that is,
condition (14) would not hold.
Proposition 4 shows that, in case 1, there is always a possibility to over-
come the old￿ s free-riding behaviour arising in equilibrium with no future
prospects provided that the young spend more resources on maintenance of
the public project than what they would spend at generational autarky.










such that (t1;t2) is sustainable in SPE
36.
Proof :
Using the quasi-linear form of v1(t1;t2), the old￿ s reward for cooperation













In case 1, the no-future equilibrium involves t￿
1 = 0 and T2(t￿
1) = t2.





1)) = ￿t1=p + a1
￿
u(ct1 + mt2) ￿ u(mt2)
￿
(22)
Similarly, using the quasi-linear form of v2(t1;t2), the cost of cooperation
given by the right-hand side of (15) can be rewritten
v2(t1;T2(t1))￿v2(t1;t2) = (t2￿T2(t1))=p+a2 [u(ct1 + mT2(t1)) ￿ u(ct1 + mt2)]:
(23)
Consider now that the old￿ s tax payment for implementation is such that
37t1 < mt2=c. Then T2(t1) = t2 ￿ ct1=m which gives
v2(t1;T2(t1)) ￿ v2(t1;t2) = (t2 ￿ t2 + ct1=m)=p + a2
￿

















which is thus equivalent to V (t1;t2) ￿ 0 under the assumptions of case
1.
If V (0;t2) > 0, then there will exist a positive tax payment t1 satisfying
V (t1;t2) ￿ 0. Setting t1 = 0 in (25) yields that the following condition





is su¢ cient to get V (t1;t2) ￿ 0 here. Moreover, since u(:) is a concave
















[1 ￿ p(￿a1 + a2)mu
0(mt2)] > 0 (28)
is stronger than (26). Condition (28) is thus su¢ cient to meet requirement
V (t1;t2) ￿ 0. From (3), we get that u0(mt2) = 1
pa2m. If t2 < t2, then 1 ￿
pa2mu0(mt2) < 0 and condition (28) could not be satis￿ed. Thus, condition
(28) requires that both conditions t2 > t2 and 1 ￿ p(￿a1 + a2)mu0(mt2) < 0
hold.
End of proof.
Proposition 4 identi￿es, in case 1, a class of SPE in which positive levels
of tax payments allow to ￿nance both implementation and maintenance of
the public project. The young￿ s tax payments belonging to this class meet
two requirements. First, they are set above the level of generational autarky
which prevails in equilibrium with no future prospects. Second, at this level
of tax, the lifetime marginal valuation of the public project would exceed the
marginal cost of implementing the public project borne by the young if they
were contributing everything. To sum up, when the old are less concerned
or scarcely more concerned about the public project than the young, the
39latter can induce the old to spend resources on implementation of the public
project by paying more taxes than they would pay in generational autarky
with no future prospects.
Let us now turn to case 2.






0(ct1) < ￿=c + 1=m; (29)
there exists some t2 > 0 such that (t1;t2) is sustainable in SPE.
Proof :
In case 2, the equilibrium tax payments with no future prospects are
t￿
1 = t1 and T2(t￿





1)) = (t1 ￿ t1)=p + a1
￿
u(ct1 + mt2) ￿ u(ct1)
￿
: (30)
Let us now consider an old￿ s tax payment for implementation such that
40t1 < mt2=c. From (30) and (24), condition (15) can be written as follows:
￿
￿
(t1 ￿ t1) + pa1
￿




u(mt2) ￿ u(ct1 + mt2)
￿
(31)
which is thus equivalent to V (t1;t2) ￿ 0 under the assumptions of case
2.
Setting t2 = 0 in (31) gives that the following condition
￿
￿










is su¢ cient to get V (t1;t2) ￿ 0 here.














(t1 ￿ t1)(￿ ￿ p￿a1u
0(ct1)c) + (t2 ￿ ct1=m)(1 ￿ pma2u
0(ct1)) > 0 (34)
is stronger than (32). Since, in case 2, we have mt2=c < t1, the previous
41inequality is weaker than
(t2 ￿ ct1=m)(￿=c + 1=m ￿ p(￿a1 + a2)u
0(ct1)) > 0: (35)
where t2 ￿ct1=m > 0. It follows that (29)is a su¢ cient condition to meet
requirement V (t1;t2) ￿ 0.
End of proof.
A cooperative equilibrium is possible in case 2 with the tax payments
stated in Proposition 5 involving both implementation and maintenance of
the public project. The old￿ s tax payments belonging to this set satisfy t1 <
mt2=c, hence they are su¢ ciently low to ensure that the young will ￿nance
maintenance of the public project even if they deviate from cooperation, i.
e., T2(t1) > 0. As mt2=c < t1 in case 2, the old￿ s tax payments t1 lay below
their level of tax payment at generational autarky, which would prevail with
no future prospects. Moreover, condition (29) means that, at the level of
tax payments t1, the lifetime marginal valuation of the public project would
be lower than its discounted marginal cost if the old were the only ones to
￿nance expenditures. Finally, when the old are far more concerned than the
young about the public project, they can induce the young to cooperate and
42maintain the public project by reducing the expenditures for implementation
below either of the levels mt2 and ct1 prevailing at generational autarky.
4 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that cooperation for public projects bene￿ting two
overlapping generations can spontaneously be enforced as an ￿implicit￿con-
tract between the old and the young generations even though they are sel￿sh.
The result obtains because, on one hand, generations are linked in an ongoing
relationship, and on the other hand, every young generation can observe the
contribution made by the previous generation to the public project. In such
a context, the young have an ability to reward the old, and thus a carrot to
motivate cooperation among generations. A collapse of this cooperation car-
ries automatic costs in the form of welfare losses stemmed from the absence
of maintenance of the public project. Furthermore, by rewarding the old,
the young reward themselves as future old. The analysis derives su¢ cient
conditions under which the young￿ s threat to behave as if there were no fu-
ture endows both generations with the correct incentives to overcome their
temptation to free-ride. The results provide new insight into the possibility
43of cooperation among overlapping generations of ￿nitely-lived agents making
sequential contributions to a public project. Two cases can be distinguished
depending on the valuation of the public project by the young versus the old.
First, in an economy with no future prospects, the old shirk paying for
implementation of the public project when they know that the young are
su¢ ciently willing to pay for it. However, in an ongoing economy, the old
have the opportunity to do better by contributing even a slight amount to
the public project. Indeed, observing this positive contribution, the young
will pay more for the project than if they had to ￿nance the whole cost
themselves. Such cooperative behaviours achieve a better result for both
generations.
Second, in an economy with no future prospects, the old contribute every-
thing when they value more the public project than the young. However, in
an ongoing economy, the old can get more utility from the project by re-
ducing their expenditures below their contribution at generational autarky.
Observing this reduction, the young will have an incentive to pay something
for the maintenance of the public project. As a result, the project is better
than that at generational autarky in the sense that it bene￿ts more both
generations. This is a somewhat paradoxical case of cooperation among gen-
44erations: reducing the old￿ s spending for a public project induces the young
to contribute to this project even though it has less appeal for them.
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